71
11
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS.
54-(1.) The financial pressure which would result from closing the British banks at Hankow, though to some extent effective for the time being, would diminish with the passage of time and cannot be relied on as a permanent means of affecting Cantonese policy. Incidentally the loss to British commercial and financial interests would be severe.
(2.) Since China is self-supporting in vital essentials a Pacific Blockade, if complete and effective, would probably damage foreign interests more severely and more permanently than Chinese interests; if partial, under our leadership. it would be even less damaging to the Chinese and would adversely affect our own position, politically and economically, to the advantage of other foreign Powers.
(3.) Assuming a state of war, a blockade of South China would, in the first instance, seriously embarrass the Nationalist Government, but would not in itself cause a cessation of hostilities since in course of time internal trade would find its way through the country, and foreign trade is not essential. The stoppage of sea- horne supplies of munitions might, however, have a serious effect on the Cantonese, the extent of which depends largely on-
(i.) The stocks now in possession of the Southern Armies. (ii) The output of the arsenals at Canton and Hanyang; and
(iii.) The amount of arms traffic which might take place through French Indo-
China and possibly North China. (See also Conclusion (6) below.) (4.) A blockade of South China might unite the North and South against the British.
(5.) Assuming a state of war, a blockade of China as a whole could probably be made effective as far as the sea is concerned. But China is not dependent for vital essentials on foreign trade and in course of time internal trade would find its way through the country. Further, supplies of ammunition would be available from the up-to-date arsenal at Mukden, in addition to those at Canton and Hanyang, and military and other essentials might be available by land-route from Russia. Supply. however, depends on communications and in this connection we draw attention to the importance of the Pekin-Tientsin-Mukden Railway.
(6.) The stoppage of importation of sulphur and nitrates might seriously hamper the manufacture of explosives. The effect of such stoppage would depend mainly on what plant exists for the manufacture of sulphuric and nitric acid from raw materials available in China. Information on this subject is not at present available.
(7.) It is unlikely that a blockade would be effective in bringing the Chinese to terms rapidly, in which case, unless a certain amount of trade with the Chinese was permitted, the destruction of our trading interests and of the Maritime Customs which would result might become even more complete and irretrievable than would be the case if a state of war alone existed.
(8.) We draw attention to the position of certain of H.M. Ships now stationed above Wuhu on the Upper Yangtse, nine of which will be, under normal circumstances, immobilised until dates varying between mid-February and the end of April.
(Signed)*
(Signed) C. P. HERMON-HODGE (Secretary).
2. Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
16th February, 1927.
CECIL (Chairman). R. G. HAWTREY. J. D. GREGORY. HAROLD SCOTT.
C. W. DIXON.
E. J. TURNER.
J. M. SPAIGHT.
R. HILL.
C. HIPWOOD.
H.
FOUNTAIN.
E. S. BERTENSHAW,
* Major Isaac (War Office) and Sir Edward Crowe (Department of Overseas Trade) were unable to sigu this Report, with which it is understood they fully agree, owing to absence.
[F 834/1/10]
15
APPENDIX No. I.
Despatch from Foreign Office to Colonial Office.
Sir,
Foreign Office, March 11, 1926. I AM directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to say that he has had under careful consideration the telegram from the Governor of Hong Kong of the 6th February enclosed in your letter of the 16th February, in which the Governor treats at length of the situation at Canton, and urges, in particular, that, in view of the treaty violations on the part of the Canton Government, His Majesty's Govern- ment should, in virtue of article 7 of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, confer with the other signatory Powers with a view to the institution of a joint counter- blockade of Canton pending the removal of the anti-British boycott. Most of the points raised by Sir C. Clementi had already been dealt with in Foreign Office letters of the 28th January and the 17th February respectively, but Sir Austen Chamberlain has in the meantime carefully considered the possibility of something in the nature of a counter-blockade, which appeared, at the time that letter was written, to deserve further examination, and I am to request that the following observations on this point may be laid before the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
+6
2. If this policy were adopted, there would appear to be three possible courses of action:-
(1.) The action proposed in 1918, 1919 and 1920, when the Canton authorities threatened to seize the customs, namely, the interception at Hong Kong by the Colonial authorities of all cargo for Canton and the refusal of entry to all cargo from Canton. This would not appear to involve any inter- ference with vessels and goods bound for Canton outside the territorial jurisdiction of Hong Kong. If this is so, it is probable that a good legal defence could be set up for the action taken, but it would be quite ineffective as a means of cutting off completely the trade of Canton.
(2.) An agreement between the Powers concerned to prevent their nationals and national ships from trading or having any communication with Canton. Such action ought not to involve any international legal difficulties, because no Power would interfere with the ships or nationals of another, and it would be incumbent upon each Power to take such steps as might be necessary under its own law to acquire the requisite powers. It would presumably not be difficult for His Majesty's Government to take such powers either by legislation at Hong Kong or otherwise, and, in any case, it is unlikely that British subjects would desire to violate any international arrangement that might be made. Such an arrangement would, however, have no effect as regards the trade of such Powers as did not join in the common action, and the trade of Canton would fall into the hands of the nationals of such Powers, notably Russia, and possibly the United States, for, even if the United States Government were willing to collaborate, it is unlikely that they could arm themselves with the necessary powers.
(3.) A pacific blockade or some similar means of coercion. In considering this action, it is necessary to bear in mind that the Government of Canton has not been recognised in any way as a Government by His Majesty's Government, and also that the proposed blockade of Canton is not intended as an act of war, but merely as a method of applying coercion in order to oblige the Canton authorities to desist from illegal action in attempting to interfere with the liberty of foreign vessels to exercise their treaty rights of trade at Canton.
It should not be overlooked, in the first place, that, if this action is taken, any member of the League of Nations, including China herself, would be entitled to bring the matter before the Council under paragraph 2 of article 11 of the Covenant. the action taken at Canton were a joint action with one of more of the other Great Powers, there would be less risk of embarrassment at the Council and less danger of an attempt to isolate His Majesty's Government. On the other hand, it would be difficult for the Peking Government to protest at the Council against such action by the Powers at Canton, because it would be clear that the action was rendered necessary by the failure of that Government to put an end to illegal action in its own
72
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.